Método analítico y la carencia de síntesis en “El conocer analítico” de la Ciencia de la lógica de Hegel

Miguel Herszenbaun

doi:10.30972/nvt.1826199

Authors

Miguel Herszenbaun Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.30972/nvt.1826199

Keywords:

Hegel, Logic, Analytic, Synthetic, Method

Abstract

In “The idea of Knowing” of the Science of Logic, Hegel intends to deal with the analytic and synthetic methods, which have played an important role in modern science and modern philosophy. In this paper, I intend to study the subsection “The analytic knowing” in order to clarify its specific relevance to the rational development of Hegel’s Logic. In this sense, I state that “The analytic knowing” presents three topics that seem to be only slightly connected: the analytic method, arithmetic, and synthetic judgments a priori. The study of this section will show that there is a guiding thread: the lack of Fortgang or advance. Thus, I will state that the goal of this section is to exhibit different ways in which there may lack synthesis and advance, and, accordingly, the need to overcome this lack and leave open the path toward a conceptually more accurate treatment of the synthesis.

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