Social Stability and Moral Development: The Construction of a Sense of Justice in Rawls

Abstract

This article examines the role of “reasonable moral psychology” in the formation of the sense of justice in Part III of A Theory of Justice. It argues that this sense cannot be reduced to an individual disposition, but rather constitutes a set of motivations and attitudes shaped in relation to the basic structure of society, and that these are indispensable for securing the stability of a fair system of cooperation. From this perspective, the article shows how Rawls incorporates an explicit concern for sociability and for the conditions that make long-term just cooperation possible.

Building on this framework, the article unfolds in three moments. In the first section, it reconstructs the sense of justice in its moral and social dimensions, highlighting the role played by reasonable moral psychology in the consolidation of stable motivations. In the second section, it examines the implications of this approach for political stability and for the congruence between just institutions and citizens’ dispositions. In the third section, it shows how this relational reading allows the sense of justice to be understood as an affective and institutionally shaped disposition, one that articulates the connection between the basic structure and citizens’ adherence to the principles of justice.

The overall aim is to clarify the normative and social character of the sense of justice and to offer an internal relational interpretation of the theory, showing how the content Rawls introduces through this concept modulates, complicates, and complements contractualist formalism, revealing internal tensions that are central to understanding his progressive and formative approach to justice.